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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00-
MARITA W. MUIR, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
MICHAEL D. MUIR, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 940081-CA 
Priority No. 15 
District Court 11093 
-ooOoo-
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION ON REMAND 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, PRESIDING 
Defendant/Appellant, MICHAEL D. MUIR, submits the following as his Reply Brief in 
the above-entitled matter: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All facts have been set forth in Appellant's Primary Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE MISREPRESENTS THE FACTS REGARDING 
THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE POST-DIVORCE INCOMES AND 
STANDARDS OF LIVING 
Mrs. Muir argues in her brief that the lower court "could not support a reduction of 
alimony" because of the "undisputed facts of Mrs. Muir's drastically diminished standard of 
living from the time of the divorce." Mrs. Muir then goes on to compare other "undisputed" 
facts of Mr. Muir's standard of living that included "many of the luxuries enjoyed by the parties 
... such as country club membership, international travel, ownership of an airplane..." to name 
just a few. Mrs. Muir's argument fails for these reasons: 
First, the facts were disputed and, while there was some evidence that Mrs. Muir's 
standard of living was reduced from that enjoyed by the parties while they were married, there 
was also ample evidence that Mr. Muir's standard of living had been reduced as well. Mr. Muir 
offered uncontroverted evidence as to the reduced popularity of bowling and the efforts he has 
made to continue to keep his gross profits at the same level, despite the fact that his necessary 
expenses continued to rise. He offered testimony about the amenities and luxuries that he no 
longer could afford to maintain, such as trading in his Porsche automobile for a Chevrolet Blazer 
and selling the airplane and the boat that he owned during the marriage shortly after the divorce 
[T. 106-107]. He testified that he had sold the country club membership and that he had taken 
only a few trips, mostly weekend trips to visit friends [T.95-96]. 
Second, the facts were also disputed as to Mrs. Muir's earnings at the time of the 
divorce. In her own testimony, she stated that she was not working at the time of the divorce 
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and that her income for the first few years after the divorce was final was nominal at best 
[T.214]. By the time of the trial on the modification, Mrs. Muir was employed full time by the 
airlines, and received additional monies from several other sources. Although Mrs. Muir argues 
that these sources were in the nature of "speculative" income, it is a self-serving argument and 
not supported by the facts of the case. Similarly, there was controverted evidence as to her 
monthly expenses and the "loss" that she claimed on the rental home she maintained in Salt Lake 
City, and which she rented to friends at a substantially reduced rate. 
Finally, it is difficult to accept the fact that the trial court found a substantial change of 
circumstances at the trial, after hearing all of the evidence, and reduced the alimony award and 
then, without making the findings this Court mandated it to make on remand and on the very 
same evidence, totally reversed its former decision. 
POINT II 
MR. MUIR HAS OBJECTED TO THE REASONABLENESS OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO REMAND 
Mrs. Muir argues that Mr. Muir has never objected to the reasonableness of the 
attorney's fees awarded by the trial court, as to the original modification trial, the appeal, and 
the hearing on remand. That is simply not the case. Mrs. Muir was awarded $3,000 of her 
attorney's fees at the trial. On remand, the trial court was instructed to enter its finding as to 
the reasonableness of the fees. The trial court entered its order requiring Mr. Muir to pay all 
of Mrs. Muir's attorney's fees, from the original trial through to the appeal of the case. Mr. 
Muir did in fact object to an award of these fees, and his objections were set forth in his 
Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact submitted to the trial court. [R. 244] Mr. 
Muir specifically objected to the reasonableness of the fees [R.251], and objected to the findings 
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as to Mrs. Muir's need for assistance with attorney's fees. The trial court's failure to rule on 
the reasonableness of the fees constitutes reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts of this case and the law, this Court should: 
1. Reverse the trial court's order that no substantial change of circumstances 
occurred since entry of the Decree of Divorce; 
2. Reverse the trial court's award of judgment against Mr. Muir and in favor of Mrs. 
Muir; 
3. Reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Muir; and 
4. Reinstate Mr. Muir's alimony obligation of $900 per month, retroactive to the 
date of the modification trial; 
5. Reinstate Mr. Muir's obligation to pay $3,000 of Mrs. Muir's attorney's fees and 
costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of October, 1994. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN " ^ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant. 
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